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Lund and Schonlau: Golden Parachutes, Severance, and Firm Value

GOLDEN PARACHUTES, SEVERANCE, AND FIRM VALUE
Andrew C.W. Lund*
Robert Schonlau**
Golden parachutes (GPs) are now standard contract provisions for
public company CEOs. While they have become ubiquitous, they have
also been severely criticized for harming shareholder value. As a result,
GPs are subjected to intense shareholder activism and are uniquely
penalized under both tax and securities law. Recent empirical work
suggests that they may indeed be associated with poor firm performance,
validating the steps taken to reduce or eliminate GPs.
This Article offers reasons to rethink the consensus that has
developed around GPs. First, this Article highlights a substantial
endogeneity problem, which earlier studies linking GPs and firm values
fail to fully answer. Second, this Article’s novel empirical analysis
suggests that the earlier evidence linking GPs with lower firm values is
not robust to the use of more recent data and may have been driven by
the omission of complete data regarding regular severance promises. It
may be that regular severance promises, rather than GPs, drive poor
performance and that past results to the contrary are likely based on
incomplete data in prior periods. These findings comport with a set of
relatively uncontroversial arguments for severance’s dominance over
GPs when it comes to shaping CEO incentives. Taken together, these
findings suggest that law and market participants ought not to necessarily
view GPs as uniquely problematic.
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INTRODUCTION
Golden parachutes (GPs) have become standard contract provisions
for public company CEOs. In 2013, over eighty percent of S&P 1500
companies promised their CEO additional payments in the event of their
termination following a change in control of the firm. 1 Since their
introduction over thirty years ago,2 these promises have been criticized
on a number of grounds ranging from their distributive consequences to
the degree to which they may harm shareholder value. This general
antipathy toward GPs has culminated in a series of unique regulatory and
non-regulatory penalties on the provisions. The tax code imposes harsh
rules on them unlike any other set of compensation promises.3 More
recently, the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act (Dodd–Frank Act)4 subjects GPs alone, among all compensation
provisions, to their own “say-on” vote by shareholders.5 In addition to
explicit regulation, the business press, politicians, and academics often
single out GPs for criticism.
Until recently, however, their effect on shareholder value has been
unclear. On the one hand, GPs may serve as an adaptive device that aligns
managers’ interests with those of shareholders, particularly shareholders’
interest in receiving takeover bids at a premium to current share prices. 6
On the other hand, GPs might provide significant ex ante effort
disincentives for CEOs by mitigating the threat of employment
termination,7 a point made with increasing specificity by several recent
1. See Vipal Monga, Approval on Golden Parachutes Rose in 2013, WALL ST. J.: THE CFO
REP. (Dec. 30, 2013, 3:18 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/cfo/2013/12/30/approval-on-goldenparachutes-rose-in-2013.
2. See PAUL A. ARGENTI, CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY 212 (2016) (noting that “the term
‘golden parachute’ was first used in 1961”).
3. See Joy Sabino Mullane, Incidence and Accidents: Regulation of Executive
Compensation Through the Tax Code, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 485, 514–16 (2009).
4. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 15 U.S.C. (2012)).
5. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1(b)(2).
6. See Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Management Entrenchment: The Case of
Manager-Specific Investments, 25 J. FIN. ECON. 123, 132 (1989).
7. See Lucian Bebchuk et al., Golden Parachutes and the Wealth of Shareholders, 25 J.
CORP. FIN. 140, 150–51 (2014) [hereinafter Bebchuk et al., Wealth of Shareholders]; Lucian
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studies.8 For instance, Professors Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen, and
Charles C.Y. Wang recently found that GP presence was correlated with
both low firm value (measured in terms of buy-and-hold portfolio values)
at the time of adoption and deteriorating firm value post-adoption.9 These
results could imply that (1) GPs are inefficient contract terms and perhaps
the result of managerial power during contract negotiations and (2) the
regulatory interventions described above are appropriately targeted and
perhaps ought to be augmented to constrain GPs even further.
There remain questions about each of the earlier studies on their own
terms.10 Leaving such issues to the side, this Article reexamines the
evidence linking GPs to firm value destruction using more recent data.
Rather than merely updating prior work, this Article enhances the
literature by including new data on another common term in CEO
employment agreements—regular severance promised to CEOs upon
termination, regardless of a change in control. Prior to 2006 the SEC
disclosure requirements did not require regular reporting of severance
arrangements with many firms simply not providing the information in
public documents. Hence, prior studies were unable to effectively control
for regular severance. Comparing the percent of CEOs at S&P 1500 firms
reporting regular severance packages just after the new disclosure
requirements with the percent who made voluntary disclosures of such
arrangements prior to 2006 illustrates the extent of the under reporting
problem. For example, the Investor Responsibility Research Center
(IRRC) data used in those earlier studies indicate that only 6.0% of CEOs
at S&P 1500 firms had regular severance arrangements in 2004. In
contrast, in 2006 with the new disclosure requirements the ExecuComp
data indicates that 50.2% of the CEOs at S&P 1500 firms had regular
severance arrangements.11 The under-reporting of severance
arrangements reflected in the IRRC data is important considering that
regular severance provides similar and perhaps greater CEO-effort
disincentives than do GPs.12
Bebchuk et al., What Matters in Corporate Governance?, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 783, 793 (2009)
[hereinafter Bebchuk et al., What Matters?]; Paul Gompers et al., Corporate Governance and
Equity Prices, 118 Q.J. ECON. 107, 148 (2003); Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 6, at 132.
8. See, e.g., Bebchuk et al., What Matters?, supra note 7, at 798, 805 (GP adoption is one
of six variables in the streamlined “E Index”); Gompers et al., supra note 7, at 128–29, 148 (GP
adoption is one of twenty-four variables in the “G Index”).
9. See Bebchuk et al., Wealth of Shareholders, supra note 7, at 151–53.
10. In their most recent work, Professors Bebchuk, Cohen, and Wang acknowledge the
substantial endogeneity issue facing their study and use various sophisticated approaches in an
attempt to resolve it. See id. at 144. As discussed in Section I.A below, this Article cautions that
causal inferences may remain problematic despite those attempts.
11. IRRC collected data in 2004 but not 2005. Id. at 142. Past studies assume that
governance variables, including severance, remain constant in years without data. Id.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 117– 20.
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This Article uses GP and severance data on S&P 1500 firms from
ExecuComp, following the implementation of new SEC disclosure rules
in 2006. This data is rich and, unlike earlier research using the IRRC data,
includes the dollar amounts associated with each type of postemployment package. This Article also presents hand-collected proxy
data from 2009 for S&P 500 firms to confirm the accuracy of
ExecuComp’s data. One of the key findings is that the correlation
between GPs and lower firm values does not continue into this more
recent period. A second key finding is that newly transparent regular
severance promises become significant in the recent period. We obtained
similar results when we measured GP and severance amount as opposed
to incidence, an approach that seems more likely to capture any incentive
effects given the wide variation in amounts promised. In sum, this
suggests that, in most circumstances, GPs do not create unique effort
disincentives and certainly none that are distinct from those created by
other common terms in CEO employment contracts. 13
Regarding the findings of a significant and negative relationship
between severance and firm performance, it remains unclear whether that
relationship is evidence of an effort-disincentive effect. That is because
the severance findings are subject to the same omitted variable concerns
discussed above. Despite the limitations to this empirical approach, we
deliberately utilized the same approach as used in the earlier GP papers,
not only to be consistent with the literature but also to highlight that (1)
even using such an approach, the correlation between GPs and lower firm
values are not robust to recent periods and (2) a different CEO contract
term, severance, appears to be more significant for firm performance than
previously believed. Ultimately, more work is necessary to determine if
such contract provisions contribute to poor firm performance.
Part I of this Article describes GPs and regular severance as well as
briefly examines the theory and evidence surrounding each. Part II offers
this Article’s findings of GP and regular severance incidence and
magnitude. It also presents findings regarding post-termination promises
and their relationship to firm value. This Article concludes suggesting the
limitations of conclusions researchers may draw about the harm caused
by GPs.
I. GOLDEN PARACHUTES AND REGULAR SEVERANCE
This Part begins with a description of GPs and regular severance, briefly
explaining the theory and evidence surrounding each. Next, it examines how
certain phenomena influence the relationship between GPs and effort

13. Of course, as is the case with most issues in executive compensation, there may be other
reasons to discourage the use of GPs, but those matters are beyond the scope of this Article.
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incentives, on the one hand, and regular severance and GPs, on the other.
A. GPs: Theory and Evidence
Beginning in the early 1980s, large U.S. firms adopted GPs in
significant numbers as a way to reduce management opposition to
takeovers.14 An active takeover market allowed acquirers to buy and fix
unsuccessful firms15 while sharing a portion of the future value with the
selling shareholders.16 Because the entire process relied on the new
owners monitoring and disciplining target management, those managers
understandably anticipated that a takeover could result in personal losses
up to and including termination.17 Thus, the threat of a takeover was also
thought to lead managers to exert more effort in the first instance so as to
make the firm a less attractive target.18 In this way, even if most firms
were not ultimately taken over, the shareholders benefitted from a vibrant
takeover market as it lowered agency costs at firms generally.19
Incumbent managers, however, were in a position to frustrate
takeovers by virtue of their control of the target company,20 causing many
takeover attempts to fail.21 In response, shareholders and their advocates
sought devices that would invigorate the market for corporate control
14. See Richard A. Lambert & David F. Larcker, Golden Parachutes, Executive DecisionMaking, and Shareholder Wealth, 7 J. ACCT. & ECON. 179, 179 (1985).
15. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target’s
Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1184 (1981); Ronald J.
Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender
Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819, 841–42 (1981); Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for
Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110, 113 (1965).
16. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 15, at 1161.
17. See Lambert & Larcker, supra note 14, at 184 (“There are three aspects of the loss
incurred by the managers of target firms. First, the manager does not receive wages until he finds
new employment. Second, the manager may not be paid as much in his new job. . . . Finally, the
manager loses any non-pecuniary benefits of his position, including his power and prestige.”).
18. See Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 6, at 126–32 (“We assume that control mechanisms
such as . . . hostile takeovers are only partially effective. It is in the interest of the manager to
make them less effective. We show how manager-specific investments help the manager reduce
the threat of replacement.”).
19. See WILLIAM T. ALLEN ET AL., COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS
ORGANIZATION 511 (4th ed. 2012).
20. The most famous entrenchment device is the poison pill, which effectively prevents
takeovers unless the target’s board approves them. See Bebchuk et al., What Matters?, supra note
7, at 792. But more subtle subversion tools are available to target managers. See Brian J.
Broughman, CEO Side Payments in M&A Deals 18–19 (Ind. Legal Studies Research Paper No.
313, 2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2584699 (“Targets generally rely
on their CEO to negotiate the merger agreement. This position gives the CEO considerable
discretion to negotiate personal benefits into the agreement that is sent to the board.”).
21. Jay C. Hartzell et al., What’s in It for Me? CEOs Whose Firms Are Acquired, 17 REV.
FIN. STUD. 37, 37 (2004).
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generally and encourage target managers to be open to takeover bids
specifically. Increased equity compensation naturally pushed in this
direction because takeovers would offer a premium to current share prices
and perhaps early vesting,22 but even managers with a significant equity
stake in the firm often faced a net financial loss upon takeover and
termination. GPs make takeovers incrementally more palatable for target
managers by promising additional payments.23 Specifically, GPs commit
acquirers to pay severance and other amounts to target managers for a
period of time following (and, in some cases, targets for a period of time
prior to) a change in control.24 In fact, some GPs do not require a
subsequent termination of employment before being paid out,25 but these
so-called “single-trigger” GPs have fallen out of favor in recent times.26
Usually, the GP defines a “change in control” trigger as a merger, the
acquisition of some percentage of company shares, or turnover of the
incumbent board.27 A number of subsequent termination scenarios then
serve as a second trigger resulting in the GP payment.28 Those scenarios
commonly involve a termination by the company without “cause” or a
resignation by the CEO for “good reason.”29 The GP payment often
includes a multiple of salary and bonus.30 It also usually permits
22. See id. at 44–45; Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, How I Learned to Stop Worrying
and Love the Pill: Adaptive Responses to Takeover Law, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 871, 884 (2002).
23. See Bebchuk et al., What Matters?, supra note 7, at 793.
24. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design
of Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 834–36 (2002) (discussing the use of GPs to
discourage CEOs from blocking takeovers).
25. See Walther, Note, Employment Agreements and Tender Offers: Reforming the
Problematic Treatment of Severance Plans Under Rule 14d-10, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 774, 782
n.25 (2002) (stating that single-trigger chutes “can be pulled simply upon a change in control”).
26. See ALVAREZ & MARSAL TAXAND, LLC, EXECUTIVE CHANGE IN CONTROL REPORT
2013/2014 9 (2014), http://www.alvarezandmarsal.com/sites/default/files/Change%20in%
20Control.pdf (reporting that, in 2013, ninety-six percent of companies with agreements included
double-trigger payouts and only nine percent of companies with agreements included singletrigger payouts). We found single-trigger payouts in 9.8% of GPs in our hand-collected data.
27. See Lambert & Larcker, supra note 14, at 179. Sales of substantially all assets of the
company are usually covered as well.
28. See Ben Walther, supra note 25, at 782 n.25 (stating that double-trigger chutes can be
pulled “only upon [the executive] losing his or her job within a certain time after a change in
control”).
29. Simone M. Sepe & Charles K. Whitehead, Rethinking Chutes: Incentives, Investment,
and Innovation, 95 B.U. L. REV. 2027, 2041 (2015). For more on definitions of “cause” and “good
reason,” see Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, An Empirical Analysis of CEO Employment
Contracts: What Do Top Executives Bargain for?, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 231, 249 tbl.3, 253
(2006) (noting “just cause” for CEO termination triggers including willful misconduct, moral
turpitude, and failure to perform duties, and “good reason” for CEO resignation triggers including
diminution in responsibilities, diminution in compensation, and forced relocation).
30. Sepe & Whitehead, supra note 29, at 2042.
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accelerated vesting of equity awards,31 if not already effected by the
change in control event under the terms of the relevant equity
compensation plans. Many GPs promise other items, including
continuation of perquisites, outplacement services, and enhanced
contributions to retirement plans.32 Finally, GPs may include provisions
to deal with tax consequences unique to the GP context,33 up to a promise
to gross up the CEO for any excise tax he would have to pay on account
of the GP.34
Those tax consequences are the result of the first legislative attack on
GPs.35 In 1984, Congress responded to a spate of high-profile transactions
and a related group of high-profile GPs by passing Sections 280G and
4999 of the Internal Revenue Code as part of the Deficit Reduction Act
of 1984.36 The former prevented firms from taking a normal
compensation deduction for “excess parachute payments,”37 while the
latter imposed a twenty-percent excise tax on recipients of excess
parachute payments.38 Until the adoption of Section 409A in 2004, which
restricted payment of deferred compensation to executives,39 GPs were
the only terms in an executive employment agreement subject to their
own special tax penalty.40
More recently, Congress passed the Dodd–Frank Act.41 The Act
includes a requirement that public companies submit the entirety of their
31. Id.
32. Id. at 2042–43. We found these “other” amounts at seventy-six percent of firms that
make some sort of GP promise.
33. See I.R.C. § 280G (2012) (excluding company deduction for excess parachute
payments); id. § 4099 (imposing excise tax on recipients of excess parachute payment).
34. Sepe & Whitehead, supra note 29, at 2043. In our hand-collected data, for instance, we
found excise tax gross-ups at 29.8% of firms with GPs in place. See infra Part II for more
descriptive statistics.
35. See Steven E. Prokesch, Too Much Gold in the Parachutes?, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 26, 1986),
http://www.nytimes.com/1986/01/26/business/too-much-gold-in-the-parachutes.html (“The golden
parachute provision of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 marked the first legislative attempt to curb
excessive golden parachutes.”).
36. Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 67(a), (b)(1), 98 Stat. 494, 585, 587 (codified as amended at
I.R.C. §§ 280G, 4999 (2012)). See generally Edward A. Zelinsky, Greenmail, Golden Parachutes
and the Internal Revenue Code: A Tax Policy Critique of Sections 280G, 4999 and 5881, 35 VILL.
L. REV. 131 (1990) (discussing the history of Sections 280G and 4999).
37. I.R.C. § 280G(a).
38. Id. § 4999(a).
39. See id. § 409A(a).
40. Section 162(m) also imposes tax consequences on high levels of pay that are not
sufficiently “performance-based.” See id. § 162(m); Mullane, supra note 3, at 519–26; Gregg D.
Polsky, Controlling Executive Compensation Through the Tax Code, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
877, 884–85 (2007).
41. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 15 U.S.C. (2012)).
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executive compensation arrangements to a non-binding say-on-pay
vote.42 In a lesser-known provision, the Dodd–Frank Act also includes a
specific “say-on-GP” provision, which requires public companies to (1)
disclose any GPs when soliciting shareholder votes on sales, mergers, or
other dispositions43 and (2) submit those GPs for a special advisory
shareholder vote.44 Thus, GPs are the only term in CEO compensation
contracts subjected to their own discrete shareholder votes.45
The results of such votes have generally been favorable for GPs.
According to a Pearl Meyer white paper, of the 298 GP votes held
between implementation in 2011 and October 31, 2013, seventy percent
resulted in high shareholder approval (eighty-percent approval or
greater), while only five percent of cases resulted in a majority of
negative votes.46 On the other hand, Institutional Shareholder Services

42. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1(a) (requiring firms to submit to a nonbinding say-on-pay vote
once every one, two, or three years, with that vote occurring no less frequently than once every
six years).
43. See id. § 78n-1(b)(1). Many targets already disclosed such information in proxy
solicitations pursuant to Item 5 of Schedule 14A, which requires disclosure of “any substantial
interest, direct or indirect, by security holdings or otherwise, of any person who has been an
executive officer or director since the beginning of the last fiscal year in any matter to be acted
upon.” Shareholder Approval of Executive Compensation, Exchange Act Release No. 9153, 99
SEC Docket 2041 (Oct. 18, 2010).
44. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1(b)(2).
45. See id. § 78n-1(a)(1) (permitting firms to avoid the special vote by disclosing GPs at an
earlier date, thereby making them subject to the regular say-on-pay advisory vote). To qualify as
having been subject to a prior say-on-pay vote (and thus exempt from the specific GP advisory
vote requirement at a later date), firms must disclose information required by Item 402(t) of
Regulation S-K. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(t) (2015). For annual report purposes, on the other hand,
they need only provide information under Item 402(j). See id. § 229.402(j). The two disclosures
are similar; thus, one might have expected firms to disclose under 402(t) to receive the waiver
from future say-on-GP votes. However, practitioners report that few firms are availing themselves
of this option, instead choosing to submit GPs to a shareholder vote in the event of a later deal.
See MICHAEL G. O’BRYAN ET AL., MORRISON FOERSTER, NEW GOLDEN PARACHUTE
COMPENSATION DISCLOSURE AND SHAREHOLDER ADVISORY VOTE REQUIREMENTS 2 (2011),
http://media.mofo.com/files/Uploads/Images/110603-SEC-Golden-Parachute-Requirements.pdf
(“Based on the filings thus far this proxy season, it is unlikely that companies will often use the
Say-on-Pay vote exception. In the months since the requirement for a mandatory Say-on-Pay vote
became effective, only a handful of issuers have voluntarily included the Item 402(t) golden
parachute compensation disclosures in their annual meeting proxy statements.” (footnote
omitted)). It seems likely that firms view the downside of waiting for a say-on-GP vote at the time
of a deal as being relatively small since the advisory nature of the vote pushes all consequences
into the future while final period transactions trigger most GPs.
46. MARGARET BLACK & DAN WETZEL, PEARL MEYER & PARTNERS, SAY ON GOLDEN
PARACHUTE VOTES 1 (2013), http://www.pearlmeyer.com/Pearl/media/PearlMeyer/Articles
Whitepapers/PMP-ART-SOGPUpdate-12-17-2013.pdf.

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol68/iss3/4

8

Lund and Schonlau: Golden Parachutes, Severance, and Firm Value

2016]

GOLDEN PARACHUTES

883

(ISS) is becoming more aggressive in its recommendations against GPs.47
ISS and other firms have guidelines relating to GPs that predate the sayon-GP regime.48 ISS’s 2013 Proxy Voting Guidelines state that the
company will make case-by-case recommendations with respect to sayon-GP votes and go on to list a number of GP features it generally
opposes—single-trigger severance or equity-vesting acceleration, cash
severance greater than three times base salary and bonus, 280G excise tax
gross-ups, etc.—but the guidelines do not indicate how the features will
be weighted in the company’s analysis or how GP compliance will be
weighted in a general say-on-pay vote.49 Other shareholder advisors and
institutional shareholders have begun to adopt similar guidelines. Glass,
Lewis & Co., ISS’s most significant competitor, has adopted guidelines
which are, if anything, even more opaque.50 Vanguard, similar to other
institutional investors, has explicitly accepted that GPs may be
appropriate in most contexts, subject to restraints on specific features.51
All of the anti-GP activity leaves unsettled the question of whether
GPs actually increase or decrease shareholder wealth. Obviously, GPs
might increase shareholder value by encouraging more takeovers at
47. See id. at 3 (“These recent changes in its voting guidelines appear to be increasing the
likelihood that ISS will issue a negative voting recommendation on transaction pay proposals. In
fact, ISS seems to be doing so roughly twice as often as for Say on Pay proposals. Negative voting
recommendations were made for 35 of the 125 SOGP proposals (approximately 28%) brought
before shareholders in meetings between February 1, 2013 and October 31, 2013. In contrast, 20%
of proposals received ‘Against’ recommendations in voting results filed through December 31,
2012, as reported in our March 2013 update.”).
48. See, e.g., GEORGESON S’HOLDER, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANNUAL MEETING SEASON
WRAP-UP 4 (1996), http://www.computershare-na.com/sharedweb/georgeson/acgr/acgr1996.pdf.
This makes sense given the common belief that GPs were the subject of a large number of
shareholder proposals in earlier periods. See Bebchuk et al., Wealth of Shareholders, supra note
7, at 140. In fact, Georgeson Annual Corporate Governance reports categorized shareholder
proposals relating to all forms of severance as “Golden Parachute” proposals, artificially inflating
the perceived levels of shareholder dissatisfaction with GPs in particular. GEORGESON S’HOLDER,
supra, at 4.
49. See INSTITUTIONAL S’HOLDER SERVS., 2013 U.S. PROXY VOTING SUMMARY GUIDELINES
54, http://www.issgovernance.com/files/2013ISSUSSummaryGuidelines1312013.pdf.
50. See GLASS, LEWIS & CO., PROXY PAPER GUIDELINES 7 (2012),
http://www.glasslewis.com/assets/uploads/2012/02/Guidelines_UnitedStates_2013_Abridged
1.pdf (noting that “[e]gregious or excessive bonuses, equity awards or severance payments,
including golden handshakes and golden parachutes” are factors that militate in favor of a negative
recommendation on a say-on-pay vote).
51. See Vanguard’s Proxy Voting Guidelines, VANGUARD, https://investor.vanguard.com/
about/vanguards-proxy-voting-guidelines (last visited Feb. 1, 2016) (“Although executives’
incentives for continued employment should be more significant than severance benefits, there
are instances, particularly in the event of a change in control, in which severance arrangements
may be appropriate. Severance benefits payable upon a change of control AND an executive’s
termination (so-called double-trigger plans) are generally acceptable to the extent that benefits
paid do not exceed three times salary and bonus.”).
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premiums to current share prices.52 GPs might also allow current
shareholders to shift compensation costs onto future shareholders.53
Finally, GPs might encourage managers to pursue risky projects and
manage for the long-term by reducing the penalties for short-term failure
normally associated with takeovers.54 On the other hand, GPs necessarily
involve the diversion of some of the takeover premium from shareholders
to executives.55 Beyond that obvious distributional concern, recent
academic criticisms of GPs have focused more on the potential for GPs
to exacerbate agency costs at public firms.56 Specifically, by making
terminations less painful, GPs might create effort disincentives for CEOs.
The theoretical ambivalence about GPs has led to substantial
empirical research over the years. Numerous studies have examined
whether GPs have actually resulted in more takeovers.57 GPs have been
associated with an increased likelihood of a firm receiving a takeover bid
and being subject to takeover activity generally.58 In certain studies, more
“important” parachutes were associated with higher likelihood of deal
completion and lower acquisition premia,59 while in others GPs were not
52. See supra notes 15–18 and accompanying text.
53. See Albert Choi, Golden Parachute as a Compensation-Shifting Mechanism, 20 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 170, 183 (2004) (suggesting that GPs permitted target shareholders to shift some
of their ex ante compensation burden onto acquirers).
54. See Sepe & Whitehead, supra note 29, at 2033–34.
55. See Lambert & Larcker, supra note 14, at 185 (“[T]he GP increases the cost of a [sic]
conducting a takeover and dismissing management. That is, the GP contract requires the acquiring
firm to retain and/or compensate executives that it might prefer to terminate. This reduces the
takeover premium that the acquiring firm is willing to pay.”).
56. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 24, at 754. There are, of course, other criticisms of GPs,
mostly centered on concerns for distributive justice. See, e.g., Paul G. Wilhelm, Application of
Distributive Justice Theory to the CEO Pay Problem: Recommendations for Reform, 12 J. BUS.
ETHICS 469, 472–73 (1993).
57. See, e.g., Thomas W. Bates et al., Board Classification and Managerial Entrenchment:
Evidence from the Market for Corporate Control, 87 J. FIN. ECON. 656, 671 (2008); Jeffery A.
Born et al., Golden Parachutes: Incentive Aligners, Management Entrenchers, or Takeover Bid
Signals?, 16 J. FIN. RES. 299, 303 (1993); Eliezer M. Fich et al., On the Importance of Golden
Parachutes, 48 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 1717, 1718 (2013); Ellie G. Harris,
Antitakeover Measures, Golden Parachutes, and Target Firm Shareholder Welfare, 21 RAND J.
ECON. 614, 614 (1990); Hartzell et al., supra note 21, at 38–39; Judith C. Machlin et al., The
Effects of Golden Parachutes on Takeover Activity, 36 J.L. & ECON. 861, 861 (1993); Jonathan
M. Karpoff et al., Do Takeover Defenses Deter Takeovers? 2–3 (Aug. 14, 2015) (unpublished
manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2608759.
58. See Bates et al., supra note 57, at 671 (finding firms with GPs 1.8% more likely to
receive a takeover bid); Machlin et al., supra note 57, at 868 (noting that firms with GPs are more
likely to undergo a change in control than firms without).
59. See, e.g., Fich et al., supra note 57, at 1728–30. The researchers derived the
“importance” of the parachute by scaling it against a model of lost wages for given CEOs. Id. at
1725.
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associated with a decrease in premia.60 Recent work on the subject by
Professors Bebchuk, Cohen, and Wang found a correlation consistent
with the former group (GP adoption associated with higher incidence of
takeovers but lower takeover premia) and further found that incidence
dominated premium amount such that GPs are correlated with higher
expected unconditional takeover premia.61 Moreover, the authors found
that even “older” GPs were associated with higher incidence of takeovers,
indicating that an executive’s private information leading her to seek out
a GP in advance of an expected takeover does not drive the observed
effect on deal activity.62
But increased deal premia do not necessarily mean that GPs are an
unalloyed good from a shareholder perspective since such findings do not
examine what happened to the firm after GP adoption but prior to a
takeover bid. Some early work found significant negative returns
following announcement of a GP, suggesting that the market may have
predicted an effort-disincentive effect.63 However, other work found
conflicting results or no relationship at all.64 More recently, a set of
sophisticated studies has found a correlation between GP adoption and
lower firm values measured in terms of Tobin’s Q, which is the ratio
between a firm’s assets and its market value. Professors Paul A. Gompers,
Joy L. Ishii, and Andrew Metrick included GP adoption in their
“governance index” (G index), although they admitted that theoretical
accounts were ambivalent about GPs’ effect on managerial
entrenchment.65 They found that GP adoption, when aggregated with
twenty-three other governance features tending toward entrenchment,
was correlated with lower firm value, though they could not determine
causality.66 Importantly for our project, regular severance incidence was
also included as a variable in the G index.67
60. See, e.g., Machlin et al, supra note 57, at 872. But see Born et al., supra note 57, at 305–
06 (noting that the presence of GPs correlated with higher cumulative abnormal returns).
61. See Bebchuk et al, Wealth of Shareholders, supra note 7, at 147–48.
62. See id. at 150.
63. See, e.g., Pamela L. Hall & Dwight C. Anderson, The Effect of Golden Parachutes on
Shareholder Wealth and Takeover Probabilities, 24 J. BUS. FIN. & ACCT. 445, 454–55 (1997);
Damian J. Mogavero & Michael F. Toyne, The Impact of Golden Parachutes on
Fortune 500 Stock Returns: A Reexamination of the Evidence, 34 Q.J. BUS. & ECON. 30, 35 (1995).
64. See, e.g., Lambert & Larcker, supra note 14, at 201 (positive returns upon GP
announcement); Born et al., supra note 57, at 299 (no abnormal returns upon GP announcement).
65. See Gompers et al, supra note 7, at 148. The researchers found a correlation between
GP adoption and fifteen of the other “Dictatorship” provisions, indicating that GPs restricted
shareholder rights. See id.
66. See id. at 142, 144–45.
67. See id. at 112 tbl. 1, 149–50 (listing regular severance as one of the provisions used for
the G index calculation).
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Next, Professors Bebchuk, Cohen, and Allen Ferrell included GP
adoption as one of six G index provisions in their streamlined
“entrenchment index” (E index).68 They found that the presence of GPs—
along with classified boards, bylaw and charter amendment restrictions,
supermajority voting provisions, and poison pills—proved explanatory
for the declines in firm value observed in Professors Gompers, Ishii, and
Metrick’s research.69 This was the case for GPs even controlling for
regular severance and the other components of the G index.70
But the interpretation of the observed correlation between GPs and
firm performance is subject to endogeneity concerns, as there is a fairly
obvious omitted variable: private information a CEO-to-be might have
about poor firm prospects. Because GPs function in part as an insurance
plan in the case of poor performance, CEOs with knowledge that firm
prospects are bleak may be more apt to demand them.71 That such firms
then experience declines in value is hardly surprising. Professors
Bebchuk, Cohen, and Wang explicitly recognize this issue in their recent
paper72 and go to great lengths to grapple with it. They use buy-and-hold
portfolios centered on “long-term GP adopters” and find a correlation
between GP adoption and lower firm value both at the time of adoption
and over a subsequent two-year period.73 Again, they control for many of
the G index variables, including regular severance.74
That firm values decline subsequent to adoption might indicate that
GPs are causing shareholder value to decline. But given that the
subsequent period is only two years post-adoption, it is equally plausible
that the negative firm prospects leading to the adoption of the GP
continued to influence poor firm performance in the second year out.75
Professors Bebchuk, Cohen, and Wang transparently acknowledge as
68. See Bebchuk et al., What Matters?, supra note 7, at 805.
69. See id. at 797 tbl.1.
70. See id. at 805–06.
71. See Lambert & Larcker, supra note 14, at 189.
72. Bebchuk et al., Wealth of Shareholders, supra note 7, at 151 (“Such a correlation [found
in earlier work] could arise either because GPs have a negative effect on shareholder value or
because of a selection effect (i.e., the greater tendency of low-value firms to have GPs). However,
the current literature has not disentangled these two effects, and we therefore proceed to examine
further the impact of GPs on shareholder value.”).
73. Id. at 153. Specifically, Professors Bebchuk, Cohen, and Wang compare firms with GPs
in the prior, current, and subsequent IRRC volumes with “long-term non-adopters”—firms that
do not have GPs in the previous, current, and succeeding IRRC volumes. Id.
74. Id. at 144.
75. The researchers attempt to solve for this by including acquired firms with GPs as “GP
adopters” to artificially raise the returns of adopting firms, since acquired firms should show an
increase in valuation. Id. at 152–53. Even with this “push,” they found statistically significant
negative valuation differences between GP long-term adopters and others, and they interpret these
findings to be consistent with the GP effort–effect hypothesis. Id. at 153.
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much: “[I]t could be suggested that [the results] are driven by a selection
effect. Under this explanation, the firms with GPs that face higher
acquisition likelihood but are not acquired for three consecutive IRRC
volumes could be very poorly performing firms.”76 Making the strongest
case available, they then included all firms acquired during the post-GP
measurement period that had been excluded in the earlier specifications.77
One would reasonably predict that acquired firms would both (1) have
had GPs and (2) experience abnormal positive returns due to the
acquisition.78 Even after including these firms, Professors Bebchuk,
Cohen, and Wang found significant negative abnormal returns.79
At the time of this Article’s publication, this represents the last, best
word on GPs’ effects on firm performance and CEO-effort incentives.
But as much as this recent work clarifies, it also suggests a puzzle—have
eighty percent of S&P 1500 firms adopted provisions in their CEO
contracts that systematically reduce shareholder wealth? Or have the
studies failed to control for variables that might explain away GPs’
apparent effect on firm performance?
B. Regular Severance: Theory and Evidence
One such variable might be regular severance, another common
provision in CEO employment agreements. Regular severance, like its
GP cousin, promises to cushion executives against the blow of a “without
cause” or “good reason” termination.80 Unlike GPs, however, regular
severance covers terminations when there has been no recent or
contemporaneous change in corporate control. Regular severance usually
consists of a cash payment, often based on a multiple of salary and
bonus,81 and may also include accelerated equity vesting, outplacement
services, pension enhancements, and continued perquisites.82 Some or all
of these payments may be conditioned on the executive agreeing to
76. Id. at 152.
77. Id.
78. Id. (“Ex ante, we should expect the inclusion of these stocks to decrease the portfolio
abnormal returns, since firms with GPs are more likely to be acquired and should therefore be
more likely to earn positive acquisition premiums.”).
79. Id.
80. See Tjomme O. Rusticus, Executive Severance Agreements 4–5 (Feb. 21, 2006)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pennsylvania), http://areas.kenan-flagler.unc.edu/
Accounting/Lists/Upcoming%20Accounting%20Events/Attachments/13/Rusticus%20Paper.pdf.
81. See id. The multiple may be equal to or less than the multiple applied to a GP. There is
no evidence of a CEO who was entitled to a higher multiple of salary and bonus under regular
severance than he was under a GP.
82. See id.; Deborah L. Jacobs, How to Get the Best Severance Deal, FORBES (Nov. 2, 2011,
5:54 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/deborahljacobs/2011/11/02/how-to-play-your-handwhen-youve-been-fired/.
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nondisclosure, noncompetition, or nondisparagement provisions.83
Severance payments may be paid in a lump sum or over time, although
the latter has become more challenging under recently established tax
rules aimed at constraining deferred compensation arrangements.84
Unlike GPs, regular severance never includes any tax gross-ups because
the tax code does not impose particular penalties on regular severance.85
Regular severance is rarely, if ever, more lucrative than a GP held by a
given CEO and is usually less lucrative.
Regular severance promises may be part of an efficient CEO
employment contract. As was the case with GPs, a CEO may anticipate
losing any firm-specific human capital investment and significant future
cash flows upon a future dismissal from the firm.86 This may be
particularly significant since high-profile dismissals bring reputational
harm, making it harder for a fired CEO to obtain a similar position in
short order and generating personal solvency and liquidity crises. 87 As a
consequence, potential CEOs may avoid taking positions at risky firms
or may demand higher wages to offset the greater risk.88 Once in office,
undiversified managers might avoid risky but valuable projects for fear
of losing their positions in downside scenarios.89 Restricted stock and, in
particular, stock options partially solve this risk aversion by increasing
the gain to the executive if the risk pays off.90 Severance agreements, on
the other hand, operate to compensate if the project fails and the executive
loses his position.91 Along these lines, regular severance promises may
83. See MICHAEL S. MELBINGER, EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION ¶ 401 (2013); Schwab &
Thomas, supra note 29, at 254–55.
84. See I.R.C. § 409A (2012); DURWARD J. GEHRING, APPLYING SECTION 409A TO
SEVERANCE BENEFITS 2 (2010), http://www.seyfarth.com/dir_docs/news_item/baa36085-d2a44ef3-bfb1-67338f98ae90_documentupload.pdf (“If the employee has no legally binding right to
receive compensation in a future year, there is no deferred compensation in the first place. . . . If
severance pay is paid in installments that could be paid in years after the year of termination, the
severance pay may be subject to Section 409A unless it meets one of the other exceptions.”).
85. See Rusticus, supra note 80, at 2 & n.2.
86. See C. Edward Fee & Charles J. Hadlock, Management Turnover Across the Corporate
Hierarchy, 37 J. ACCT. & ECON. 3, 5 (2004).
87. See id.; Stuart C. Gilson, Management Turnover and Financial Distress, 25 J. FIN.
ECON. 241, 261 (1989); Hartzell et al., supra note 21, at 49, 51.
88. Brian D. Cadman et al., Are Ex-Ante CEO Severance Pay Contracts Consistent with
Efficient Contracting? 7–8 (Nov. 15, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1773070.
89. Id. at 7.
90. See John E. Core et al., Executive Equity Compensation and Incentives: A Survey, 9
FED. RES. BANK N.Y. ECON. POL’Y REV. 27, 29, 33 (2003). Options also limit losses as the
executive is free to decline to call the shares.
91. See Nengjiu Ju et al., Options, Option Repricing in Managerial Compensation: Their
Effects on Corporate Risk, 29 J. CORP. FIN. 628, 639 (2014).
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(1) induce a talented CEO to join a firm even though the CEO faces a
significant information deficit regarding the firm and (2) encourage risktaking once in place.92 Firms operating in volatile environments or where
the CEO is new to the organization typically should be more likely to
make regular severance promises.93 Similarly, regular severance
promises should appear more often in contracts covering CEOs who
might bear particularly large labor market penalties following a
termination.94
On the other hand, regular severance promises may represent run-ofthe-mill rent extraction by powerful managers. The managerial power
may be a product of the agency problems Professors Bebchuk and Jesse
M. Fried famously described,95 or it may simply reflect an overestimation
of marginal CEO value in board negotiations with new hires, particularly
new hires from outside of the firm.96 In either case, regular severance
promises may reflect rents obtained by management as a result of these
sorts of market inefficiencies rather than provisions that increase
shareholder wealth.
Even in a world of arm’s length bargaining, prior theoretical accounts
were ambivalent as to whether regular severance enhances firm value
generally. As discussed above, severance agreements may encourage
CEOs to take on risky but valuable projects.97 Yet such promises are also
open to an effort-disincentive critique similar to the one leveled at GPs.
If the threat of termination for poor performance motivates CEOs to exert
effort, then reducing the costs of such terminations might lead to less
effort.98 Thus, an alternative hypothesis regarding severance adoption is
that it would be correlated with higher risk-taking but lower firm value
going forward.
92. See Stuart L. Gillan et al., Explicit Versus Implicit Contracts: Evidence from CEO
Employment Agreements, 64 J. FINANCE 1629, 1631 (2009); Ju et al., supra note 91, at 638.
93. Gillan et al., supra note 92, at 1631; Roman Inderst & Holger M. Mueller, CEO
Compensation and Private Information: An Optimal Contracting Perspective 4–5 (N.Y. Univ.,
Working Paper No. CLB-06-022, 2006), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1
291610; see also Rusticus, supra note 80, at 8–9 (summarizing other arguments for the
efficiency of regular severance, including encouraging CEOs to share bad news).
94. For instance, younger or poorer CEOs, or those currently enjoying large compensation
levels, will bear larger costs from an involuntary termination than older or wealthier CEOs or
those paid less. See Gillan et al., supra note 92, at 1635 (providing evidence that CEOs expecting
to earn greater abnormal compensation over time are more likely to have contractual protection).
95. E.g., LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE 8 (2004); Bebchuk
et al., supra note 24, at 784.
96. For more on the unique attributes of negotiations over new CEO hires, see RAKESH
KHURANA, SEARCHING FOR A CORPORATE SAVIOR 186–203 (2004).
97. See supra text accompanying note 92.
98. See Rusticus, supra note 80, at 7.
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Relatively little work, however, has been done to examine the
question of regular severance’s effect on firm performance. Professors
Stewart J. Schwab and Randall S. Thomas, using a database compiled by
The Corporate Library, found high levels of regular severance in CEO
employment contracts.99 But they found CEO employment contracts for
only 375 of 865 firms that responded to The Corporate Library’s
inquiry.100 Similarly, Professors Stuart Gillan, Jay C. Hartzell, and Robert
Parrino found only 225 explicit CEO employment agreements either
voluntarily provided to The Corporate Library or referenced in SEC
filings on EDGAR among S&P 500 firms in 2000.101 Professor Tjomme
O. Rusticus studied a sample of agreements with starting CEOs hired
from 1994 through 1999.102 He hand collected severance agreements
referenced in SEC filings and found that just over half of the CEOs in
that cohort of 305 had some sort of severance promise in their
agreements.103 He also found conflicting evidence on the relationship
between severance promises and CEO turnover.104 Finally, economist
Peggy Huang found that straight severance incidence correlated with
higher investment levels but that the higher investment was valuedecreasing for firms.105
Professors Brian D. Cadman, John L. Campbell, and Sandy Klasa
hand collected post-2006 proxy data and found high levels of regular
severance relative to historic estimations by database providers.106
Moreover, they found that regular severance is correlated with stock
return volatility, firm leverage, and focused (as opposed to diversified)
99. See Schwab & Thomas, supra note 29, at 251.
100. Id. at 240, 242. Surprised by this finding, Professors Schwab and Thomas were
eventually able to track down documents to allow them to conclude that the “vast majority” of
CEOs had some sort of contractual arrangement regarding their employment but did not indicate
whether the newly discovered arrangements provided for severance. Id. at 241.
101. Gillan et al., supra note 92, at 1636–37. Of the agreements they studied, 91.8% had
terms distinguishing terminations with and without cause. Id. at 1638–39. Even assuming each of
those contracts offered payments upon without-cause terminations, the numbers imply that over
half of S&P 500 CEOs are operating without regular severance protection. Studies from earlier
eras reveal even smaller numbers. See, e.g., Anup Agrawal & Charles R. Knoeber, Managerial
Compensation and the Threat of Takeover, 47 J. FIN. ECON. 219, 226 (1998) (noting that twelve
percent of Forbes 800 firms had CEO employment agreements).
102. Rusticus, supra note 80, at 17–18.
103. Id. at 18. The 305-firm sample was drawn from the S&P 1500. Consistent with other
studies, Professor Rusticus found that eighty-six percent of CEOs in his sample had some form
of a GP. Id. For those CEOs who obtained severance promises, the median promised payout was
equivalent to $2,278,000, about three-quarters of which came in the form of cash. Id. at 19.
104. Id. at 33–34.
105. Peggy Huang, Marital Prenups? A Look at CEO Severance Agreements 29 (Mar. 15,
2011) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1786540.
106. Cadman et al., supra note 88, at 2, 3 n.4.
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acquisitions—each a proxy for firm risk-taking.107 Finally, they found
some indication of increased firm value, using acquisition announcement
returns and the contribution of cash holdings to firm value as proxies.108
However, Professors Cadman, Campbell, and Klasa did not control for
GP adoption, leaving open the possibility that GP promises rather than
regular severance drive the correlations.
C. A Fresh Look at Golden Parachutes and Effort Incentives
Do CEOs with GPs exert less effort? Do regular severance promises
create similar incentives? If both, which is more important? The
empirical studies undertaken to this point are unclear on these questions.
Significant endogeneity concerns remain, with studies showing a
correlation between GP adoption and lower firm values. Moreover,
although earlier work suggesting GP effort-incentive effects controlled
for regular severance,109 the studies used IRRC databases for pre-2006
periods that indicated startlingly low levels of severance.110 Prior to 2006,
researchers (including IRRC) had to rely on voluntary provision of
severance terms to research requests111 or to comb through CEO
agreements and severance plans intermittently filed as exhibits to
periodic reports.112 For instance, in 2004, the IRRC database reported that
only 6.0% of firms offered straight severance promises to their CEOs.113
Professors Cadman, Campbell, and Klasa, however, found CEO straight
severance at 73.7% of firms in their hand-collected sample covering
2006–2007,114 generally consistent with the 50.2% and 72.0% of S&P
1500 firms ExecuComp found in 2006 and 2013 respectively and the
63.8% we find in our hand-collected sample of 2009 S&P 500 firms.115
Some of the disparity may reflect changes in contracting between the preand post-2006 periods. Certainly, it is logical that the demand for
severance would rise as CEO positions became more precarious over this
period.116 However, the stark differences between the historical IRRC
data and the recent data from ExecuComp, Professors Cadman,
107. Id. at 22–28.
108. Id. at 29.
109. See supra notes 54–58 and accompanying text.
110. See, e.g., Bebchuk et al., What Matters?, supra note 7, at 783–84, 797 (reporting
severance arrangements in 2002 at only 6.1% of firms); see also Agrawal & Knoeber, supra note
101, at 228 (noting that only two percent of Forbes 800 firms had both GPs and explicit executive
employment contracts).
111. See, e.g., Schwab & Thomas, supra note 29, at 240.
112. See, e.g., Rusticus, supra note 80, at 5; Schwab & Thomas, supra note 29, at 241.
113. Data on file with authors.
114. Cadman et al., supra note 88, at 2, 17–18.
115. Data on file with authors.
116. See infra Subsection I.C.1.
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Campbell, Klasa, and this Article indicate that prior studies that evaluated
GPs while controlling for severance may have used inaccurate datasets.
At the very least, the disparity calls into question the applicability of prior
work’s GP-incentive-effect findings to today’s contracting environment.
Prior to a discussion of the empirical analysis, this Article examines
whether a GP or straight severance is more likely to provide effortdisincentive effects in today’s CEO labor market. Because CEOs were
rarely fired outside of the change in control context during earlier periods,
it may have been plausible to believe that GPs were the crucial posttermination promise for CEO incentives.117 However, there is more
reason today to believe that straight severance should create equal or
greater effort disincentives than a GP in many circumstances. Poorperforming CEOs face far more significant labor market penalties outside
of the takeover context than before.118 Moreover, a well-known practice
of paying ex post “deal bounties” to target CEOs119 has provided a
substitute for ex ante GP promises, making them potentially less
important to CEO incentives. Finally, GP values are more dependent on
share prices than straight severance values,120 potentially mitigating
incentives for CEOs to slack. Given these phenomena it seems plausible
that straight severance will play a greater role vis-à-vis GPs in shaping
CEO behavior than they may have in prior periods.
1. The New CEO Labor Market and Regular Severance
GPs arose in a corporate governance environment where acquirers
were seen as the most, and perhaps only, dynamic actors among potential
monitors.121 Shareholders at public companies were dispersed and
rationally ignorant, and boards were seen as yielding and generally
absent.122 For example, CEO turnover was so rare outside the takeover
context that many believed the managerial labor market produced few

117. See, e.g., Dirk Jenter & Fadi Kanaan, CEO Turnover and Relative Performance
Evaluation, 70 J. FINANCE 2155, 2163 (2015) (excluding CEO turnovers associated with mergers
from the CEO turnover analysis); Lucian A. Taylor, Why Are CEOs Rarely Fired? Evidence from
Structural Estimation, 65 J. FINANCE 2051, 2064 (2010) (excluding CEO dismissals due to a
takeover in the study involving the low occurrence of CEO firings).
118. See supra text accompanying note 94.
119. See infra Subsection I.C.2.
120. See Marcia Heroux Pounds, Office Depot CEO Could Walk with $39 Million After
Merger, SUN SENTINEL (Feb. 10, 2015, 5:51 PM), http://www.sun-sentinel.com/business/
consumer/fl-office-depot-ceo-golden-parachute-20150210-story.html.
121. See supra notes 14–17 and accompanying text.
122. See Bengt Holmstrom & Steven N. Kaplan, Corporate Governance and Merger Activity
in the United States: Making Sense of the 1980s and 1990s, 15 J. ECON. PERSP. 121, 123 (2001).
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incentive effects.123 Product markets and capital markets compelled some
level of managerial effort, but the market for corporate control was
commonly understood to be the most important constraint on managerial
slack.
However, alternative devices to drive managerial effort have become
far more robust over time.124 Institutional shareholders hold a greater
share of the public equity market than ever before.125 Hedge funds have
taken the lead in a new brand of shareholder activism and have drafted
otherwise sleepy monitors like mutual funds to their side in battles with
management.126 Proxy advisory firms have increased their influence,
lowering monitoring costs generally.127 And, at the same time that
shareholders have increased their monitoring activities, boards have
become more active in enforcing share price maximization and other

123. See, e.g., Core et al., supra note 90, at 30, 45 n.2 (2003) (noting that the assumption of
ignoring termination threats for incentive purposes “likely does not hold for CEOs with large
turnover probabilities”). Research at the end of the twentieth century confirmed this view. Kevin
J. Murphy, Executive Compensation, in 3B HANDBOOK OF LABOR ECONOMICS 2485, 2547 (Orley
C. Ashenfelter & David Card eds., 1999) (finding a 7.9% probability of departure for young CEOs
at average-performing firms increasing only to an 8.5% probability if the young CEO’s firm
realizes returns 30% below industry average); Kevin J. Murphy & Ján Zábojník, Managerial
Capital and the Market for CEOs, 28–30 (Apr. 2007) (unpublished manuscript),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=984376 (finding “departure probabilities for
CEOs realizing returns 30% below the industry average were increased by 0.4% in the 1970s,
0.7% in the 1980s, and 0.4% in the 1990s” and concluding that “the turnover-performance
relation . . . has fallen since the 1980s”).
124. See William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder
Empowerment, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 653, 691–709 (2010); Kahan & Rock, supra note 22, at 896–
97; Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Embattled CEOs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 987, 1039–40, 1051 (2010).
125. See Kahan & Rock, supra note 124, at 998 (“Mutual funds . . . have taken off, tripling
their percentage holdings from 7% to 22%.”); see also Paul Rose, Common Agency and the Public
Corporation, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1355, 1356 (2010) (noting that ownership of public companies
has become more institutionalized).
126. Kahan & Rock, supra note 124, at 998, 1001–04. For more on the interplay between
activist investors and mutual and pension fund voting, see generally Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey
N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist Investors and the Revaluation of
Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863 (2013) (finding that institutionalized ownership of
equity has led to an agency problem because institutional records owners and beneficial owners
do not have the same interests). For a recent example of this phenomenon, consider the saga of
Sotheby’s, in which Daniel Loeb’s activism led to the CEO’s departure. See Laura Lorenzetti,
Sotheby’s CEO Steps Down After an Extended Activist Investor Battle, FORTUNE (Nov. 21, 2014,
10:40 AM), http://fortune.com/2014/11/21/sothebys-ceo-steps-down-after-an-extended-activistinvestor-battle/.
127. See Kahan & Rock, supra note 124, at 1005. For an example of how proxy advisory
firms wield influence over governance questions, see Andrew C.W. Lund, Say on Pay’s Bundling
Problems, 99 KY. L.J. 119, 121, 126–27 (2010).
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shareholder-friendly rules.128 At least partially as a result of this more
interventionist environment, executive compensation has tilted heavily
toward a performance-based pay model.129 This tilt may itself have
affected CEO effort.130
The new interventionism has led most directly, however, to a far more
penal managerial labor market at public companies. Between 1992 and
2007, the CEO turnover rate was 15.8% annually, and the average tenure
of a CEO was less than seven years.131 The increased turnover rate was
not random either. CEO terminations were closely linked with changes
in share price measured against industry-adjusted and market-adjusted
performance. The correlation between poor performance and turnover is
particularly strong in cases of lagging performance on an industryadjusted basis, and boards are correspondingly more generous to CEOs
where a firm at least outperforms its industry.132 This “limited
arbitrariness” provides significant effort incentives to CEOs at firms
where below-median industry-adjusted performance is more than a de
minimis possibility,133 exactly the sorts of firms that are likely to be
potential takeover targets. While there may remain a threshold level of
underperformance necessary to trigger labor market discipline,134 it is
128. See Andrew C.W. Lund & Gregg D. Polsky, The Diminishing Returns of Incentive Pay
in Executive Compensation Contracts, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 677, 693, 705 n.121 (2011).
129. See Lund & Polsky, supra note 128, at 684–85. But see Bebchuk et al., supra note 24,
at 754 (presenting their managerial power model of executive compensation).
130. Elsewhere, one of us has criticized the assumption that performance-based pay currently
produces exceptionally important CEO incentive effects. See Andrew C.W. Lund, Compensation
as Signaling, 64 FLA. L. REV. 591, 600–04 (2012); Lund & Polsky, supra note 128, at 682–83.
Even if redesigned compensation structures can no longer deliver on the promise to dramatically
reshape CEO incentives, the shift to performance-based pay was likely significant at some point.
131. Steven N. Kaplan & Bernadette A. Minton, How Has CEO Turnover Changed?, 12
INT’L REV. FIN. 57, 58 (2012). Similar results were reached in a recent study on CEO tenure. Joann
S. Lublin, CEO Tenure, Stock Gains Often Go Hand-in-Hand, WALL ST. J. (July 6, 2010,
12:01 AM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703900004575325172681419254.
html (finding that the average S&P 500 CEO tenure is 6.6 years and that—excluding founders—
only twenty-eight such executives have had tenures exceeding fifteen years).
132. See Jenter & Kanaan, supra note 117, at 2165–79; see also Lund & Polsky, supra note
128, at 702–04 (finding a correlation between poor performance and CEO turnover, but noting
that boards can filter out “exogenous shocks” to firm share price as long as CEOs outperform
peers in the industry).
133. See Lund & Polsky, supra note 128, at 704.
134. See, e.g., Jenter & Kanaan, supra note 117, at 2160–61; see also John C. Coates IV &
Reinier Kraakman, CEO Tenure, Performance and Turnover in S&P 500 Companies 15–17
(European Corp. Governance Inst., Finance Working Paper No. 191/2007; Harvard Law Sch.,
Law & Econ. Discussion Paper No. 595, 2010), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=925532 (explaining patterns of CEO turnover in terms of a “term structure” wherein CEOs are
unlikely to depart in the first three-year term, much more likely to depart in the subsequent term,
and relatively unlikely to depart in the final term).
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hard to imagine CEOs with career concerns exploiting any slack in such
a labor market.
This more penal labor market obviously makes straight severance
more relevant to CEO incentives than it would have been in prior eras
when terminations effectively only occurred post-takeover. As straight
severance protections become relatively more important to CEOs vis-àvis GPs, it is to be expected that effort disincentives related to straight
severance should also become more pronounced.
2. Renegotiating Promises and Introducing Promises Midstream
Regular severance promises, like GPs, are ex ante promises made by
a firm to its CEO that inform the CEO’s expectation of payouts in the
event of his termination.135 But it may be that a CEO believes he will be
able to extract a payout from the firm at the time of his future termination
in any event. Earlier work finds some evidence supporting such an
expectation.136 If so, that possibility should make the provisions’
marginal incentive effects weaker. As the CEO is more certain of his
ability to gain ex post severance, the ex ante promise becomes less
important. Effort disincentives may exist, but they no longer depend on
the presence of a contractual promise.
But such ad hoc contracting dynamics, if they exist, would seem more
relevant in the GP context. For regular involuntary terminations,
departing CEOs will likely have at least some difficulty extracting
additional severance payments from firms beyond that specified in their
contracts.137 What leverage they have consists mainly of personal
relationships with directors (who just fired them), public relations
headaches to avoid, and possibly noncompetition promises.
Ahead of a takeover, on the other hand, an incumbent CEO will often
have the ability as gatekeeper to condition the acquisition on her personal
receipt of substantial sums.138 Recall that this phenomenon is largely the
cause of GPs becoming common in the first place. Studies have found
that CEOs without GPs are able to extract significant additional
compensation from bidders through the takeover process.139 If, as seems
plausible, parties informally negotiate deal bounties as opposed to
135. See supra Section I.B.
136. See, e.g., David Yermack, Golden Handshakes: Rewards for CEOs Who Leave 1–2, 9
(N.Y. Univ., Working Paper No. FIN-04-020, 2004), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1294455 (finding “only a minority of [observed] severance pay is delivered according
to pre-negotiated contracts”).
137. See id. at 7 (“CEOs who are dismissed should receive little or no severance [outside of
contracted-for amounts], since their ability probably proved to be lower than expected.”).
138. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
139. See, e.g., Broughman, supra note 20, at 5–9.
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satisfied private equity firms bestowing them as ex post gifts, parties will
likely similarly bestow such bounties even when the target CEO does not
continue as an employee of the firm. Other studies validate this
expectation. Professor Brian Broughman summarized much of this work
and found that bounties or side payments averaged $2 million for CEOs
of target firms.140 Side payments consist of enhancements to existing
GPs, amounts paid in exchange for noncompetition pledges or consulting
services, and unscheduled stock option grants ahead of a deal’s
announcement.141 These amounts do not take into account compensation
paid for continued employment, which may also function as a non-GP
side payment.142
The existence of side payments tends to cut against an effortdisincentive hypothesis as it relates to GPs. Predictable side payments
should make ex ante GPs less important to CEO behavior since CEOs can
expect to extract ex post GPs in any event. In terms of CEO effort, this
implies that CEOs with GPs should behave similarly to those without
them. Certain boards may be able to override CEO resistance to a deal,
thereby removing the CEO’s leverage to extract side payments from an
acquirer.143 A CEO cognizant of his vulnerable position vis-à-vis sidepayment extraction would tend to be influenced by the guarantee of
compensation and might exert less effort than one without the contractual
protection. But the argument for GPs providing effort disincentives that
are unique from those provided by regular severance then requires a
board that is (1) able to force a CEO to promote a takeover and (2) not
interested in terminating the employment of a CEO outside of the
takeover context for exerting low effort or taking too little risk.
3. Equity-Heavy GPs
Finally, a significant portion of a GP’s value consists of accelerated
vesting of equity awards. ExecuComp does not distinguish between the
components of a GP, but in our hand-collected data we found that 81.9%
of GPs involve the acceleration of some amount of equity, with the
median value of such accelerated equity equaling 34.7% of the total GP
package. Regular severance, on the other hand, is much less likely to
include accelerated vesting of equity. In many cases, departing CEOs
forfeit all unvested equity awards. We found that only 50.6% of regular
140. Broughman, supra note 20, at 7.
141. Id. at 6. Professors Jay C. Hartzell, Eli Ofek, and David Yermack suggest that these side
payments are substitutes for continued employment. See Hartzell et al., supra note 21, at 44. When
continued employment is observed, CEO compensation increases over pre-deal compensation by
over $4 million, implying that this is the cost perceived by incumbent managers of being subject
to a takeover. See id. at 44, 52–53.
142. See Broughman, supra note 20, at 5–7.
143. See id. at 6.
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severance packages include such vesting, with a median value of 43.9%
of a severance package.
Accordingly, if the safety net provided by GPs is contingent to a great
extent on share price received in the takeover, the CEO has reason to exert
at least some minimal level of effort to support that price. On the other
hand, because regular severance payouts are less a function of share price,
they do not provide even that floor for CEO effort. In both cases, the CEO
will have significant vested equity holdings providing some effort
incentives regardless of post-termination payment promises, but at the
margins GPs seem more apt to include incentives to drive shareholder
value.
Taking all of this together, one would expect that regular severance,
depending upon its magnitude relative to a GP, would produce equally or
more significant effort disincentives than GPs, contrary to the recent
studies measuring GP effort disincentives. In the next Part, this Article
tests this hypothesis.
II. EFFECTS ON PERFORMANCE
The goal was to quantify specific types of post-termination promises
and examine their effects, if any, on CEO incentives using the same
types of empirical approaches used in the past with GPs. Thus, we
compiled regular severance and GP arrangements for the 2006–2013
period at S&P 1500 firms. We generally used ExecuComp, which began
coding the information in 2006. We also hand collected 2009
arrangements at S&P 500 firms after reviewing proxy statements as a
check on ExecuComp’s coding, which has been questioned.144 Contrary
to Professors Bebchuk, Cohen, and Wang’s work on the 1990–2007
period,145 we found that the presence of a GP in the 2006–2013 period
did not have a statistically significant relationship with either current
Tobin’s Q or Tobin’s Q two years following observation of the GP.
Moreover, when we controlled for severance during this period,
severance was significantly negatively related to both measures. For the
first time in the literature, we not only controlled for GPs using indicator
variables as done in prior studies, but we also used continuous variables
for GP and severance dollar amounts. Even using dollar amounts, we
still did not find a statistically significant relationship between GP
amounts and firm performance in recent years. But we did find a
significant and negative relationship between firm value and
severance.146
144. See supra text accompanying note 106 (Professors Cadman, Campbell, and Klasa
questioned the database’s information prior to 2006 because historic estimations of severance
agreements were found to be inaccurate).
145. See Bebchuk, et al., Wealth of Shareholders, supra note 7, at 143.
146. In unreported results, we examined the stock performance of firms with and without
GPs using more recent data. Unlike the earlier studies, we did not find that firms with GPs
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A. Data Collection and Sample Description
We observed GP and severance data for S&P 1500 firms in 2006–
2013 using ExecuComp’s database. We additionally hand-collected data
on GPs and regular severance at S&P 500 firms as reported on their 2009
proxy statements.147 As of 2006, SEC rules require public companies to
tabulate all post-termination payments they were obligated to make to
named executive officers.148 Before that change, researchers faced
considerable difficulties in determining the values promised to CEOs
upon departure—whether voluntary or involuntary, related to a change in
control or not.149 Even with the tabulation requirements, the coding
process is not trivial and requires substantial analysis and interpretation.
Perhaps as a result, our estimates of post-termination amounts often differ
slightly from those of ExecuComp, though our estimates of incidence are
broadly consistent.150
In our hand-coding exercise, we collected information on the amount
of post-termination compensation promised and its terms. We divided
termination payments into three groups: (1) amounts payable upon
voluntary termination; (2) amounts payable only upon termination
without cause or for good reason; and (3) GPs—amounts payable upon a
change in control of the firm, a termination without cause, or a resignation
for good reason in the context of a change in control.151 Professors
Cadman, Campbell, and Klasa specifically excluded the first category,
which consists of retirement accounts and deferred compensation
accounts, because they were looking specifically for incremental risktaking incentives provided by severance agreements.152 It is likely that
such vested amounts, if large enough, create a wealth effect that would
make regular severance and GPs inconsequential with respect to CEO

experience negative abnormal returns relative to non-GP firms, further highlighting the notion
that the earlier conclusions about GPs’ supposed disincentive effects may have been an artifact of
the data in that particular time period and not a universal or robust result.
147. For firms issuing proxy statements in October, November, or December, we used the
2008 proxies.
148. See, e.g., Executive Compensation and Related Person Disclosure, Securities Exchange
Act Release Nos. 33-8732A, 34-54302A, 2006 WL 6325877 (Aug. 29, 2009).
149. For more on the specific difficulties, see Cadman et al., supra note 88, at 12 & nn.9–
10.
150. Professors Cadman, Campbell, and Klasa note the same issue in their study of 2007
proxies. Id. at 15–16. Also, our data covers only S&P 500 firms while ExecuComp includes S&P
1500 firms.
151. Many payments are conditioned on the CEO entering into non-competition or
confidentiality agreements with the firm, which we assumed to be regularly completed.
152. See Cadman et al., supra note 88, at 13.
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incentives.153 It would be fruitful in future work to incorporate measures
of background wealth in determining the incentive effects of posttermination promises.
ExecuComp codes GPs as values payable due to a termination related
to a change in control and severance as values payable due to an
involuntary, without-cause termination.154 Consistent with earlier studies,
we merged the ExecuComp and hand-collected data with annual financial
data from the CRSP–Compustat merged sample by fiscal year and firmidentifying information. We also merged in firm CEO and insider
characteristics, such as CEO age, tenure, and ownership from
ExecuComp. We excluded firms from our dataset if there were missing
variables from these sources. Our final sample includes 11,147
observations.
Table 1 provides summary statistics regarding firms and posttermination promises for the period.
Table 1: Characteristics of CEOs in Sample
Tenure
Total annual compensation
Salary
Bonus
Value of CEO equity holdings
Value of accumulated pension
Aggregate deferred
compensation
ExecuComp CIC
ExecuComp severance
ExecuComp CIC > $1M
ExecuComp severance > $1M

count
mean155
p5
p50
p95
11,147
8.99
2.00
7.00
24.00
11,147
5763.85 666.27 3848.25 16,847.63
11,147
810.92 310.00
763.75
1456.00
11,147
227.16
0.00
0.00
1100.00
11,073 111,196.01 1164.86 17,981.02 254,138.75
11,146
3233.03
0.00
0.00 17,517.50
11,147
11,147
11,147
8770
6611

2876.74
0.00
183.37 12,224.43
13,962.76
0.00 7881.99 47,450.79
7245.08
0.00 2042.69 30,967.39
17,724.31 1968.17 11,367.29 51,875.00
12,146.55 1312.25 6058.36 40,266.02

The median CEO in our sample was fifty-six years old and had a
tenure of seven years. The median annual compensation for CEOs was
about $3.85 million. The average post-termination obligation to a CEO
under any termination circumstances (i.e., vested amounts) was $3.23
million in pension amounts and $2.88 million in deferred compensation
balances, both of which were dwarfed by CEO equity holdings, with the
average CEO holding $111 million in vested company equity with a
median of almost $18 million.
The average post-termination obligation to a CEO following a
153. For an explanation of how wealth effects on CEO incentives are likely to be large but
difficult to measure, see John Core & Wayne Guay, The Use of Equity Grants to Manage Optimal
Equity Incentive Levels, 28 J. ACCT. & ECON. 151, 179–80 (1999).
154. See, e.g., Cadman et al., supra note 88, at 8 (“Earlier work on CEO severance pay has
focused on payments, often called golden parachutes, that CEOs receive when their firms are
acquired. . . . More recently, there has been interest in severance payments given to dismissed
CEOs that are not paid out in the context of a firm being acquired.”).
155. Numbers represent thousands.
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“without cause” or “good reason” departure (i.e., regular severance) was
$7.25 million, and the median amount was $2.04 million. During the
sample period, severance incidence ranged (and continuously increased)
from 50.2% of firms (2006) to 72.0% (2013). The percentage of CEOs
with promised severance of more than $1 million ranged from 45.6%
(2006) to 64.3% (2013). Conditioned on the CEO having a regular
severance promise of more than $1 million, the median promised
payment was $6.06 million. In sum, this data confirms Professors
Cadman, Campbell, and Klasa’s findings on severance incidence and
suggests a significant departure from the IRRC severance data from 1990
to 2006, in which regular severance incidence ranged from 5.8% to 13.6%
of firms.
The average obligation to a CEO under a GP is $13.96 million, and
the median amount is $7.88 million. During the sample period, GP
incidence ranged from 69.7% of firms (2006) to 85.6% (2013). The
number of CEOs with promised GPs of more than $1 million ranged from
67.6% (2006) to 83.7% (2013). Conditioned on the CEO having a GP
with a value over $1 million, the median promised payment is $11.37
million—slightly less than two times the median of regular severance
promises.
As expected, there is significant overlap between GP firms and
severance firms. In the sample from 2006, 91.9% of CEOs with regular
severance promises also had GPs, and 66.1% of CEOs with GPs also had
regular severance promises. For 2013, 95.7% of CEOs with regular
severance promises also had GPs, while 80.6% of CEOs with GPs also
had regular severance promises.
B. Regular Severance, GPs, and Firm Value
We first attempted to confirm the earlier finding that the presence of
a GP is associated with lower firm value. As Table 2 demonstrates, there
is a significant negative relationship between GP presence and Tobin’s Q
during the 1990–2006 period and a negative but insignificant relationship
in the 2006–2013 period. We use Tobin’s Q consistent with the G Index
and E Index papers but not with the buy-and-hold portfolio approach
from Professors Bebchuk, Cohen, and Wang’s most recent paper.156
Because we cannot measure adoption of the GP at most firms during the
sample period, as the vast majority of firms already had GPs, an approach
focused on returns is unable to rule out the possibility of the market
pricing the disincentive effects prior to the sample period.157 Similar
156. See Bebchuk et al., Wealth of Shareholders, supra note 7, at 151.
157. In unreported results, we examined the stock performance of firms with and without
GPs using more recent data. Unlike the earlier studies, we did not find that firms with GPs
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concerns likely apply to findings related to severance in the analyses
below.
Table 2: GP Incidence Versus Firm Value (Base Case)158
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Dependent Variable:
Sample:

ln(5+Qt)
IRRC

ln(5+Qt+2)
IRRC

ln(5+Qt)

ln(5+Qt+2)

ExecuComp

ExecuComp

Period:
GP in place (t)

1990–2006
-0.026***
(<.001)
-0.012***
(<.001)
-0.020***
(<.001)
0.082*
(0.067)
-0.003
(0.600)
0.693***
(<.001)
0.380***
(<.001)
0.004***
(<.001)
-0.001**
(0.044)
1.713***
(<.001)
Yes
Yes
25,862
0.264

2006–
2006–
1990–2006 2013
2013
-0.021***
-0.008
-0.008
(<.001)
(0.129)
(0.150)
-0.010***
-0.017***
-0.017***
(<.001)
(<.001)
(<.001)
-0.015***
-0.013***
-0.010**
(<.001)
(0.001)
(0.026)
0.066*
0.001
0.007
(0.078)
(0.970)
(0.690)
-0.005
-0.000
-0.005
(0.358)
(0.928)
(0.297)
0.512***
0.970***
0.834***
(<.001)
(<.001)
(<.001)
0.256***
0.336***
0.282***
(<.001)
(<.001)
(<.001)
0.004***
0.115***
0.098***
(<.001)
(<.001)
(<.001)
-0.001**
-0.001
-0.001
(0.045)
(0.509)
(0.346)
1.696***
1.704***
1.717***
(<.001)
(<.001)
(<.001)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
25,862
11,147
11,147
0.181
0.428
0.352

ln(1+Assets)
ln(1+Firm Age)
Leverage
Delaware
ROA
CAPEX to Assets
RD per Sales
Herfindahl Index
Constant
Year controls
Industry controls
Observations
R-square

In the first two specifications, we were able to replicate findings from
earlier studies demonstrating the significance of GP incidence for firm
performance during the pre-2006 period. Relative-industry Tobin’s Q is
experience negative abnormal returns relative to non-GP firms, further highlighting the notion
that the earlier conclusions about GPs’ supposed disincentive effects may have been an artifact of
the data in that particular time period and not a universal or robust result.
158. Three asterisks shows significance at the 1% confidence level—the most powerful.
One asterisk represents the 10% level—still significant but less so. Two asterisks is 5%.
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calculated as the firm’s Q minus the industry median Q for that year
(either the year of GP observation or two years subsequent, depending
upon the specification). We added 5 to this value because in cases where
a firm’s Q is below the industry-median Q, the relative-industry Q can
range as low as negative 4.8 in the sample. In the first and second
specifications, we used contemporaneous and forward-looking measures
of Tobin’s Q using IRRC data for the pre-2006 period studied in earlier
work. For purposes of measuring CEO incentive effects, the second
column is particularly important to account for subsequent firm
performance that may be driven by CEO incentives in the initial year but
takes time to filter through performance. To avoid survivorship biases, in
the cases where Q is not available in year t+2 for a firm, we used the Q
value from t+1. In the third and fourth specifications, we find those results
do not continue into the post-2006 period as predicted by the effortdisincentive hypothesis. Our inability to replicate earlier results when
using more recent data, even when not controlling for severance, calls
into question that hypothesis.
We further explored the relation between firm value and incentive
payments in light of new information about severance. As discussed
above, IRRC’s pre-2006 data on severance differs remarkably from
ExecuComp’s for the post-2006 period and our hand-coded data for
2009.159 Given the high correlation between GPs and regular severance
in the latter datasets, we added severance as a control to the regressions
in Table 3.
Table 3: GP Incidence Versus Firm Value (with Severance Control)
(1)
ln(5+Qt)
IRRC
1990–2006
-0.027***
(<.001)
Severance in place (t) -0.007
(0.386)
ln(1+Assets)
-0.012***
(<.001)
ln(1+Firm Age)
-0.020***
(<.001)
Leverage
0.082*
(0.065)
Delaware
-0.003
Dependent Variable:
Sample:
Period:
GP in place (t)

(2)
ln(5+Qt+2)
IRRC
1990–2006
-0.022***
(<.001)
-0.009
(0.254)
-0.010***
(<.001)
-0.015***
(<.001)
0.066*
(0.076)
-0.005

(3)
ln(5+Qt)
ExecuComp
2006–2013
0.002
(0.788)
-0.017***
(<.001)
-0.016***
(<.001)
-0.013***
(0.001)
0.002
(0.887)
0.001

(4)
ln(5+Qt+2)
ExecuComp
2006–2013
0.002
(0.809)
-0.018***
(0.002)
-0.017***
(<.001)
-0.010**
(0.019)
0.009
(0.615)
-0.004

159. See Cadman et al., supra note 88, at 13; supra Part II.
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ROA
CAPEX to Assets
RD per Sales
Herfindahl Index
Constant
Year controls
Industry controls
Observations
R-square

(0.612)
0.693***
(<.001)
0.379***
(<.001)
0.004***
(<.001)
-0.001**
(0.042)
1.714***
(<.001)
Yes
Yes
25,862
0.264

(0.369)
0.513***
(<.001)
0.255***
(<.001)
0.004***
(<.001)
-0.001**
(0.042)
1.698***
(<.001)
Yes
Yes
25,862
0.181

903

(0.883)
0.969***
(<.001)
0.335***
(<.001)
0.115***
(<.001)
-0.001
(0.604)
1.706***
(<.001)
Yes
Yes
11,147
0.430

(0.412)
0.833***
(<.001)
0.282***
(<.001)
0.098***
(<.001)
-0.001
(0.417)
1.719***
(<.001)
Yes
Yes
11,147
0.354

In the first (contemporaneous) and second (forward-looking)
specifications covering the pre-2006 period, we found that GPs’
correlation to firm performance is robust to inclusion of severance as a
control variable, similar to the results from earlier studies. Recall,
however, that these specifications use questionable IRRC severance data
driven by the lack of transparency in reporting severance packages during
that time.
For the 2006–2013 period, we used ExecuComp data on severance
with markedly different results given the changes to disclosure
requirements discussed above. Indeed, the results show that severance is
significant under both specifications at the one-percent level. GPs are no
longer significant and, indeed, their correlation has switched from
negative to positive (although statistically insignificant). This suggests
that an omitted severance variable due to data collection problems at
IRRC may explain earlier findings of the relationship between firm
performance and GP incidence. Thus, our central finding is that there is
little evidence that GPs have a CEO effort-disincentive effect, even
leaving aside the serious endogeneity problems discussed above.160
160. In Golden Parachutes and the Wealth of Shareholders, Professors Bebchuk, Cohen, and
Wang do not use Tobin’s Q and instead describe a regression where a monthly portfolio return in
month t is regressed on the following four factors:
(Monthly Portfolio Return)t = a + B1(Rm-Rf)t + B2(SMB)t + B3(HML)t +
B4(Carhart)t + (error)t
They report the results from this regression where they calculate monthly portfolio return slightly
differently depending upon the prior, current, or continued status of a firm as a GP adopter. They
interpret the intercept as the monthly “risk-adjusted excess returns.” See Bebchuk et al., Wealth
of Shareholders, supra note 7, at 151 (describing buy-hold portfolio methodology). In unreported
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After the 2006 amendments to the SEC disclosure rules, we were also
able to more easily observe severance and GP amounts along with
incidence. More granular detail regarding post-termination promises
should provide a better view into such promises’ incentive effects.
Severance and GP promises are not all alike and, indeed, the data shows
substantial variation among firms. GP and severance amount rather than
incidence is better able to capture this heterogeneity. Thus, we reran the
regressions in Table 3, removing binary variables for GP and severance,
instead using the total amounts promised.
Table 4: GP Value Versus Firm Value (Base Case with Severance
Control)
Dependent Variable:
Sample:
Period
ln(Execucomp GP $s)

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

ln(5+Qt)
ExecuComp
2006–2013
-0.000
(0.927)

ln(5+Qt+2)
ExecuComp
2006–2013
-0.000
(0.597)

ln(5+Qt)
ExecuComp
2006–2013
0.001*
(0.082)

ln(5+Qt+2)
ExecuComp
2006–2013
0.001
(0.299)

-0.017***
(<.001)
-0.010**
(0.027)
0.007
(0.721)
-0.005
(0.294)
0.834***
(<.001)
0.283***
(<.001)
0.098***
(<.001)
-0.001
(0.349)
1.712***
(<.001)
Yes
Yes
11,147
0.351

-0.002***
(<.001)
-0.016***
(<.001)
-0.013***
(0.001)
0.001
(0.950)
0.001
(0.912)
0.968***
(<.001)
0.337***
(<.001)
0.115***
(<.001)
-0.001
(0.598)
1.699***
(<.001)
Yes
Yes
11,147
0.429

-0.002***
(0.005)
-0.017***
(<.001)
-0.010**
(0.022)
0.008
(0.656)
-0.005
(0.385)
0.833***
(<.001)
0.282***
(<.001)
0.098***
(<.001)
-0.001
(0.406)
1.713***
(<.001)
Yes
Yes
11,147
0.353

ln(1+Execucomp severance
$s)
ln(1+Assets)
ln(1+Firm Age)
Leverage
Delaware
ROA
CAPEX to Assets
RD per Sales
Herfindahl Index
Constant
Year controls
Industry controls
Observations
R-square

-0.017***
(<.001)
-0.012***
(0.001)
-0.001
(0.971)
-0.000
(0.917)
0.970***
(<.001)
0.337***
(<.001)
0.115***
(<.001)
-0.001
(0.513)
1.698***
(<.001)
Yes
Yes
11,147
0.427

results, we replicated the contemporaneous GP adopter analysis using each year’s ExecuComp
data. We designate each firm as either being a GP or non-GP firm, depending on whether
ExecuComp reports a non-zero dollar value in the change-in-control payment each year 2006–
2013. We obtained insignificant intercepts using either equal-weighted or value-weighted
approaches.
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Similar to the results in Table 3, we found an insignificant correlation
between GP amounts and firm performance (both forward-looking and
contemporaneous) when not controlling for severance. When we did
control for severance amounts, similar to the earlier results, we found a
statistically significant negative relationship between severance amounts
and firm performance, although this time at the one-percent level
(contemporaneous Tobin’s Q) and five-percent level (forward-looking
Tobin’s Q). The relationship between GP amounts and firm performance
remained insignificant in the lagged returns and actually was positively
correlated with firm performance at the ten-percent level. Given
endogeneity concerns, we were extremely reluctant to interpret these
findings as indicating that severance provisions harm CEO incentives and
therefore firm value. Such an interpretation is subject to the same
omitted-variable rejoinder discussed above in relation to the GP results
from the pre-2006 period. But our results do suggest that earlier studies,
hamstrung by the data source’s failure to provide accurate severance
information, offer little support for a GP-disincentive-effect hypothesis.
There remains little evidence, then, that GPs harm shareholder value.
CONCLUSION
These findings must be cautiously interpreted insofar as they imply
severance is an important driver of firm value. Interpretations about
causation are fraught in this sphere given the candidates for omitted variables
discussed above. Grappling with this endogeneity in some way would be an
obvious next step in future research. Moreover, we have left concerns about
CEO background wealth to the side in our analysis, consistent with past
work. Given the importance that background wealth plausibly has in
determining effort incentives, future research incorporating related
adjustments would be welcome.161
These findings, however, do strongly suggest that the empirical evidence
previously thought to link GPs with CEO-effort disincentives is suspect.
Indeed, this Article’s central contribution is demonstrating that earlier
findings of a relationship between GPs and poor firm performance are not
robust to the use of more recent data and that the omission of complete data
regarding regular severance promises may have driven them. This finding
coincides with uncontroversial theoretical reasons for believing that GPs
should matter less than regular severance for CEO incentives absent
extraordinary differences in magnitude. Along this line, the finding that
severance dominates GPs holds when using newly available continuous
variables measuring both sorts of post-employment promises.
161. Additionally, a straightforward implication of our work is to call into question some of
the IRRC data from earlier periods that have formed the basis for many important papers in law
and finance. We cannot say what other fields in those databases are subject to the problems we
found with respect to severance.
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In sum, there remains little uncontroverted evidence that GPs pose a
threat to shareholder value in an environment—especially where regular
severance is regularly available. We could not rule out the possibility that
GPs might matter for CEO incentives if companies greatly diminish
severance. But our findings, along with the mass adoption of GPs across
firms and the general shareholder acquiescence to their adoption, do call
into question the special opprobrium GPs receive at the hands of
regulators, the business press, and some shareholder activists. Perhaps
companies ought to reduce or dispense with GPs entirely, but the
argument for doing so must rest for now on grounds other than
shareholder value.
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